Oligarchs and state-business relations in Russia
Stanislav Markus
Chapter 36 in Elgar Encyclopedia of Business and Government, 2026, pp 205-211 from Edward Elgar Publishing
Abstract:
Russia's super-wealthy and politically influential elites – or oligarchs – have assumed renewed importance during the Kremlin's war in Ukraine. The oligarchs were created during the privatization of the 1990s. After Putin came to power in 2000, he subordinated the oligarchs to the state: the oligarchs could keep their fortunes as long as they supported the Kremlin's priorities. Under Putin, state procurement became the new engine of oligarchic enrichment. Three types of oligarchs exist today: Putin's friends, the silovarchs, and the outsiders. As a whole, the oligarchs seek more predictability from the Kremlin and more security for their assets – but they do not necessarily desire democracy or the rule of law proper. The oligarchs cannot force the Kremlin to guarantee their property rights due to the internal divisions among the oligarchs, as well as the Kremlin's complete control of coercion. Internationally, the oligarchs continue to challenge the West by projecting Russia's political influence abroad, laundering money in the West, underwriting disinformation campaigns, and facilitating the evasion of sanctions by the Kremlin. Finally, a comparative and historical perspective suggests that oligarchs have good reasons to fear democracy, but this fear can be overcome. Yet in the Russian context, the gap between the oligarchs and the population at large will remain dramatic. While Putin remains popular among the Russian citizens, the oligarchs are decidedly not.
Keywords: Oligarchs; Privatization; Sanctions; Rule of law; Putin; Russia (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2026
ISBN: 9781035307777
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