Regulatory capture

Georg Rilinger

Chapter 41 in Elgar Encyclopedia of Business and Government, 2026, pp 239-243 from Edward Elgar Publishing

Abstract: Regulatory capture occurs when regulatory agencies prioritize the interests of industry stakeholders over the public interest, leading to government failure. Initially conceptualized in economic theory by Stigler (1971), the framework has evolved to distinguish between material and cognitive capture. Material capture involves direct influence through bribery or the revolving door, whereas cognitive capture shapes regulators’ perceptions and priorities. The theory has moved from a critique of government to an empirical research framework. Contemporary debates focus on defining the public interest, evidentiary standards, and mechanisms of capture, with future research exploring new industries like AI and platform economies.

Keywords: Regulatory capture; Material capture; Cognitive capture; Public interest; Deregulation; Regulatory failure (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2026
ISBN: 9781035307777
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