Business lobbying and regulation in the European Union

David Coen and Alexander Katsaitis

Chapter 9 in Elgar Encyclopedia of Business and Government, 2026, pp 47-54 from Edward Elgar Publishing

Abstract: Over the past three decades, business lobbying in the European Union (EU) has evolved significantly, driven by institutional transformations, regulatory expansions, and the professionalization of government affairs. With nearly 13,000 registered interest groups, lobbying has become an essential mechanism for businesses to engage with EU policymakers. The EU's single market and the delegation of powers to EU institutions have created a system of resource interdependence between policymakers and interest groups, where information, credibility, and trust act as key political currencies. This evolving lobbying landscape has two key features. At the macro-level we observe the rise of “elite pluralism”, which allowed businesses to dominate policy discussions. At the meso-level, “chameleon pluralism”, we observe variance in interest group density and diversity across policy fields depending on institutional demands and the nature of expertise required. In the EU's multi-venue, multi-actor political environment, successful business lobbying favors consistent and considerate lobbying behavior, which blends the firm within Brussels’ lobbying landscape through coalition building. Given the increasing complexity of lobbying, regulation and transparency measures have become critical. Trust, credibility, and reliable expertise remain key, while successful advocacy resembles a soft-spoken marathon building trust and creditability, rather than a bold dash to the finish line.

Keywords: Pluralism; Business Lobbying; Interest Groups; Resource-Exchange; EU Public Policy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2026
ISBN: 9781035307777
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://www.elgaronline.com/doi/10.4337/9781035307784.00014 (application/pdf)
Our link check indicates that this URL is bad, the error code is: 403 Forbidden

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:elg:eechap:22116_9

Ordering information: This item can be ordered from
http://www.e-elgar.com

Access Statistics for this chapter

More chapters in Chapters from Edward Elgar Publishing
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Jack Sweeney ().