 Punishment and technocracyVictor Lund Shammas Chapter 5 in Research Handbook on Penal Policy, 2026, pp 87-110 from Edward Elgar Publishing Abstract: Chapter 5 analyzes the concept of penal populism, which posits that punitive policy transformations are significantly driven by public opinion, often construed as inherently retributive, and amplified by both law-and-order politicians and a sensationalist press. It contrasts this with an implicit penal elitism, a technocratic counter-ideal suggesting that penal policy should be insulated from popular influence by expert-driven “buffers.” The chapter argues that the “strong” conceptualization of penal populism, which often underpins calls for such insulation, is undemocratic and rests on problematic essentialisms regarding the public (as inherently punitive), experts (as inherently rational brakes), politicians (as inherently retributive), and the media (as monolithically sensationalistic). Rather than advocating for the elite insulation of criminal justice policymaking, the chapter contends that popular attitudes are historically contingent and expert views are not devoid of ideology. Deepening democratic processes in penal policymaking is a more normatively sound alternative to technocratic buffering. Keywords: Penal populism; Penal elitism; Technocracy; Democratic theory; Politicization; Penal policy (search for similar items in EconPapers) Downloads: (external link) Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:elg:eechap:22152_5 Ordering information: This item can be ordered from Access Statistics for this chapter More chapters in Chapters from Edward Elgar Publishing |
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