Rethinking Systems of Survival: Jane Jacobs amplified via complexity theory

Meg Tuszynski and Richard E. Wagner

Chapter 4 in Handbook on Institutions and Complexity, 2025, pp 66-82 from Edward Elgar Publishing

Abstract: In her Systems of Survival, Jane Jacobs described the qualities of social order as depending on substantive features of interaction among the carriers of two distinct moral syndromes, which she described as commercial and guardian. Jacobs’ formulation is fraught with unexplored analytical possibilities. This chapter undertakes one such exploration by amplifying her initial formulation by filtering it through some principles of complexity theory. We start by recognizing that economics applies the same name to two distinct fields of study. During its classical period, the object of economic theory was society itself, where only a small part of the object was directly visible. Over the following century, economics morphed into a theory of rational action as described by models of utility maximization and systemic equilibrium. While rational action treats its phenomena as simple in the sense of Weaver (1948), the classical conceptual scheme wrestled with complex phenomena before suitable theoretical ideas were available for theorists to work with. As the economy has grown ever more complex, our models have grown overly simple. As a consequence, they are missing some key features of human action and interaction. The solution is not to develop ever more complex models, but rather to better understand the sorts of tools that can give us insight into human action.

Keywords: Jane Jacobs; Commercial moral syndrome; Guardian moral syndrome; Monstrous moral hybrids; Massed societies; Fissured societies; Entangled political economy; Factionalism vs reciprocity (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
ISBN: 9781035309719
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