The dejudicialization of global economic governance: a paradigm shift in international economic law?

Ming Du

Chapter 4 in A Research Agenda for Global Power Shifts and International Economic Law, 2025, pp 107-126 from Edward Elgar Publishing

Abstract: The objective of this chapter is to reflect on the rise and fall of judicialization in international trade and investment regimes and explore the future of international economic dispute settlement. It makes two key arguments. First, the severe disjuncture between the anticipated benefits of international dispute settlement and the actual costs imposed on states explains the recent dejudicialization in international economic law. Second, international economic dispute settlement will survive, but substantial transformation is necessary to meet contemporary challenges.

Keywords: Dejudicialization; World Trade Organization (WTO) dispute settlement; WTO Appellate Body; Multi-Party Interim Appeal Arbitration Arrangement (MPIA); Investor–state arbitration; Legitimacy crisis (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
ISBN: 9781035311491
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