Executive compensation and executive turnover in China: what have we learned and what have we not?

Cheryl Xiaoning Long

Chapter 9 in Research Handbook on Corporate Governance in China, 2025, pp 190-203 from Edward Elgar Publishing

Abstract: This chapter reviews the existing literature on the relationships between executive compensation, CEO turnover, and corporate performance in publicly traded Chinese companies. It also discusses promotion tournaments as an incentive mechanism and the role of ownership structure in shaping executive compensation and turnover in China. The chapter identifies a growing trend in listed Chinese firms to link executive compensation to firm performance but questions the effectiveness of these arrangements given the poor performance of Chinese stock markets in the past two decades. The chapter also points out the limitations of past research on executive compensation and turnover and the unique challenges of conducting this line research in China, and suggests future research priorities.

Keywords: Corporate governance; Executive compensation; Executive turnover; Managerial incentive; Tournament incentive; China (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
ISBN: 9781035312603
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