From political incentive to blame avoidance: revisiting the 20-year trajectory of China’s environmental politics

Ran Ran

Chapter 3 in Handbook on Climate Change and Environmental Governance in China, 2024, pp 42-54 from Edward Elgar Publishing

Abstract: Since 2012, China has made tremendous progress in environmental and climate change governance which connects domestic environmental actions to global leadership on climate change and national revival. Many studies on Chinese environmental politics argue that in the context of the recentralized environmental governing structure, the fragmented authoritarianism model is increasingly giving way to the authoritarian environmentalism model; “Selective implementation” and huge gaps between policy and implementation, lamentable hallmarks of the Hu-Wen era, have given way to the blunt force campaign style of “enthusiastic policy implementation”. Revisiting the 20-year trajectory of China’s environmental politics, however, the key question that remains to be examined is how local governments translated the top leaders’ strong political will into quantitatively measurable environmental performance in the context of China’s authoritarian environmentalism. This chapter explores the complex facets of China’s authoritarian environmentalism by examining two institutional perspectives—political incentive and blame politics. These constraints will both explain why more than 60 million people in rural China are still plagued by shortages of safe and clean water supply, despite the authority’s political commitment and rhetoric.

Keywords: Asian Studies; Environment; Politics and Public Policy Sustainable Development Goals (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
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