Continuismo v Rompismo: neocaudillismo and the electoral dominance of incumbents, ex-presidents, and newcomers in Latin America

Javier Corrales

Chapter 4 in The Elgar Companion to the Economies of Latin America and the Caribbean, 2025, pp 119-144 from Edward Elgar Publishing

Abstract: The three most prominent actors in electoral politics in Latin America consist of: incumbent presidents, ex-presidents, and newcomers (low-experienced candidates). More than 75% of Latin American elections since 1986 have featured at least one if not all three of these actors. Because they each have a high probability of winning elections, I describe them as Latin America's neocaudillos, a term in Spanish for new strongmen. They each enjoy advantages that allow them to outcompete rivals. That said, electoral success differs across each type of neocaudillo: high for incumbent presidents, less so for ex-presidents and newcomers. I also discuss each cohort's respective disadvantages. These disadvantages depend on variations in cognitive biases across different parts of the electorate (demand-side), political party system features (institutional context), as well as each cohort's potential for networking (supply-side). I also discuss the conditions under which neocaudillos bolster or undermine democratic governance. The main conclusion is that an often-unrecognized electoral cleavage in the region has to do with continuity-vs-rupture supplementing other more-studied cleavages such as the left-vs-right and the liberal democracy-vs-populism divides.

Keywords: Neocaudillos; Incumbency advantage; Cognitive bias; Relatives; Newcomers; Outsiders; Political dolphins; Democratic backsliding; Status quo bias; Party system volatility (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
ISBN: 9781035317196
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