Neutral mediation in pursuit of international agreements

Liliane Stadler

Chapter 21 in Handbook on the Politics of International Agreements, 2026, pp 325-338 from Edward Elgar Publishing

Abstract: Some argue that neutral states are ideally suited to mediate international agreements to end armed conflict. Others argue that neutral states often lack leverage to compel conflict parties to reach an agreement. The literature indicates that the historic record of neutral state mediation is relatively mixed – both with regard to the number of times that neutrals have been asked to mediate and the number of times they were successful in resolving armed conflict through lasting international agreements. This chapter argues that neutrality is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for the resolution of armed conflict. However, neutral states have historically provided good offices in order to demonstrate that their neutrality had something to offer to the international community. As a consequence, they have gathered considerable experience and institutional memory in the domain, and there is value in that for conflict parties who are determined to end their differences.

Keywords: Neutrality; Mediation; Good Offices; Leverage; Conflict Resolution; Non-Alignment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2026
ISBN: 9781035318582
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