Power sharing: the promises, paradoxes and perils of power sharing in peace agreements

Timothy D. Sisk

Chapter 26 in Handbook on the Politics of International Agreements, 2026, pp 401-413 from Edward Elgar Publishing

Abstract: Can power-sharing peace agreements provide a pathway to sustainably resolving today's conflicts, providing for an inclusive political settlement? While promising in principle and in commitment to inclusiveness, power sharing as a pathway to sustaining peace is much more contentious in experience. Inclusive power-sharing solutions are promising as exclusion is a root cause of conflict when identity interacts with socio-economic factors to increase conflict risk. However, power-sharing settlements are paradoxical: when structured along ethnic identity lines, such representation poses deep challenges that may worsen conflict by furthering ethnic patterns of politics. Many of the power-sharing agreements to settle prior conflicts are now deeply vulnerable to collapse. Thus, power-sharing agreements should be subject to renegotiation and evolution away from identity-based inclusion over the longer term, even as new negotiations may open a Pandora's Box of uncertainties and new conflict risks.

Keywords: Civil War; Peace Agreements; Political Institutions; Ethnic Politics; Power Sharing; Political Transitions (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2026
ISBN: 9781035318582
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