 Alliance treaties: writing the terms of military cooperationPaul Poast and Hope Dancy Chapter 2 in Handbook on the Politics of International Agreements, 2026, pp 36-48 from Edward Elgar Publishing Abstract: This chapter explores the unique features and structure of alliance treaties within the world of international agreements. It clarifies the difference between simple allies and formal alliance agreements, emphasizing that the written form is central to the latter. By examining the “who,” “when,” “what,” and “how” provisions, the chapter shows how treaties specify terms of military cooperation while retaining significant flexibility. Defensive, offensive, consultative, neutrality, and non-aggression clauses reveal how vague language allows states to maintain autonomy in crises. The discussion explores strategic, signaling, and habitual motivations for formalizing alliances and traces historical parallels between alliance and colonial agreements, showing that international cooperation and power asymmetry are not mutually exclusive. Contemporary examples such as NATO's expansion and Russia–China security cooperation demonstrate the continued importance of written alliances for security coordination and deterrence. Keywords: Alliance Treaties; Military Cooperation; Treaty Design; Signaling; Hierarchy and Asymmetry; Security Commitments (search for similar items in EconPapers) Downloads: (external link) Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:elg:eechap:22652_3 Ordering information: This item can be ordered from Access Statistics for this chapter More chapters in Chapters from Edward Elgar Publishing |
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