Corridor of political corruption

Arvind K. Jain ()

Chapter 1 in Understanding Political Corruption, 2025, pp 1-22 from Edward Elgar Publishing

Abstract: Political corruption, in which political leaders misuse their powers to expropriate society's wealth, becomes possible when the monitoring institutions of a society are weak. This volume proposes an alternate causal relationship between corruption and society's monitoring institutions. It is not that weak institutions fail to notice or control corruption; rather, the desire for corruption leads political leaders to take steps that will weaken these institutions. They begin by creating alliances that help them first undermine the power of these institutions and then extract wealth from society. Such alliances become progressively stronger along a corruption corridor. Once the wealth has been expropriated, corrupt politicians and their allies use the financial markets and full cooperation of the industrialized countries to safeguard their wealth. Control of corruption would not be possible without the cooperation of the global economy.

Keywords: Political corruption; Political elite; Monitoring institutions; Corruption alliances; Corruption corridor; Global financial markets (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
ISBN: 9781035325092
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