Individual political corruption

Arvind K. Jain ()

Chapter 2 in Understanding Political Corruption, 2025, pp 23-33 from Edward Elgar Publishing

Abstract: In systems where monitoring institutions are strong, a politician can engage in an act of individual political corruption – a visible exchange of policy favors for compensation – only by taking the risk of being discovered and penalized. Despite the risks, there are frequent examples of this type of corruption. Firms discover a variety of techniques to compensate politicians who are willing to do political favors for them. Many studies find evidence that firms and politicians are willing to engage in corrupt deals that benefit them at the cost of the public.

Keywords: Individual political corruption; Public welfare; Compensation; Political contributions (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
ISBN: 9781035325092
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