Corruption under authoritarian regimes

Arvind K. Jain ()

Chapter 4 in Understanding Political Corruption, 2025, pp 57-87 from Edward Elgar Publishing

Abstract: Authoritarian rulers come in different shapes and sizes: looters, oligarchs, or dictators. To succeed, they must undermine the effectiveness of monitoring institutions; looters do that under a façade of democracy while dictators dispense with the notion of the public having any political rights. Authoritarian rulers must build strong alliances with collaborators who will help them first undermine the monitoring process and then expropriate a society's wealth. This chapter provides examples of each type of authoritarian ruler, with an emphasis on the processes they employ to build their alliances and enrich themselves. The chapter also highlights summaries of studies that have examined the consequences of corruption resulting from authoritarian rulers.

Keywords: Looters; Oligarchs; Dictators; Political rights of the public; Weakening of monitoring institutions (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
ISBN: 9781035325092
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