Controlling political corruption

Arvind K. Jain ()

Chapter 7 in Understanding Political Corruption, 2025, pp 135-149 from Edward Elgar Publishing

Abstract: Industrialized countries are conflicted in their dealings with corrupt countries that may be sources of capital for their financial markets. The investment of this capital acts as a stimulus for the domestic economy. In addition, the investing country may have previously aided in the achievement of foreign policy goals. Recipient countries, keeping their long-term interests in mind, discourage the investment of illegitimate wealth by implementing measures such as the identification of beneficial owners, unexplained wealth orders, tax treaties, and asset recovery programs. The public, whether in countries that experience corruption or in countries that welcome investment from corrupt wealth owners, must recognize the long-term consequences of corruption and begin to understand the rights and responsibilities it possesses to encourage policies that would serve the interests of both sets of countries. Enablers of such investments must share in the responsibility for isolating corrupt wealth owners.

Keywords: Long-term cost of political corruption; Beneficial owner; Unexplained wealth order; International tax treaty; Asset recovery (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
ISBN: 9781035325092
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