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Article 24: Supervisory authorities

Michaela Streibelt

Chapter 23 in Sustainable Business in Europe, 2026, pp 307-321 from Edward Elgar Publishing

Abstract: The CSDDD like most other EU legislative acts is enforced by the Member States according to their national administrative law. Nonetheless, it provides for specific requirements in relation to the setup and powers of the supervisory authorities enforcing the CSDDD. Specifically, Article 24 sets forth requirements in relation to competence and collaboration of supervisory authorities, their independence, and their annual report. Member States can designate one or several national authorities for the enforcement of the CSDDD. They are allowed to designate the authorities for the supervision of regulated financial undertakings. In relation to EU-companies, the supervisory authority of the State where the company has its registered office is competent. For non-EU-companies, the State where they have a branch or generate most of their turnover, is competent. Article 24(4) provides for different competent supervisory authorities to cooperate with one another in cases in which the parent company is fulfilling the due diligence obligations on behalf of its subsidiary. In addition to cooperating when a parent company is fulfilling due diligence obligations on behalf of a subsidiary, Article 28 requires the Commission to set up a Network of Supervisory Authorities to foster cooperation, coordination, and alignment among supervisory authorities. In relation to independence, Article 24(9) requires supervisory authorities to be legally and functionally independent which includes a certain degree of independence from other public entities including government bodies supervising them. This is necessary since national supervisory authorities act as enforcement authorities of the EU when enforcing EU law. This requires Germany to provide for more independence of the BAFA, which is responsible for the enforcement of the German Due Diligence in Supply Chains Act since the BAFA is not functionally independent from the German Federal Ministry for Economy and Climate Action.

Keywords: Supervisory Authority; Authorities; National Regulatory Authority; Regulatory; Supervisor; Competent; Competence; Competency Enforcement; Independence; Control; Effectiveness; Equivalence; Procedural Autonomy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2026
ISBN: 9781035326891
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