Post-colonial justice in the post-prohibitionist market: a political economy view on IP and cannabis
Bryan Khan
Chapter 14 in Intellectual Property and Cannabis, 2025, pp 294-321 from Edward Elgar Publishing
Abstract:
This chapter explores the parallels between cannabis regulation and intellectual property (IP) law from a political economy and postcolonial perspective. In line with these traditions, the discussion is broad and conceptual rather than doctrinal or empirical. The chapter begins by observing that the international system for drug regulation is rooted in inherent coloniality. Furthermore, common features of international drug regulation and international IP link these frameworks to a larger matrix of colonial power in international law. Overall, current trends in cannabis reform create regulatory misalignments in the international trade system, leading to significant first-mover advantages for early-reforming countries. These advantages include substantial lead-time in the production of cannabis-related IP assets in the post-reform market, thus securing a pre-emptive competitive advantage in international trade. As beneficiary countries are mostly industrialised economies in the Global North, this results not only in a strengthening of economic positioning but also a reinforcement of colonial injustices. Cannabis legal reform therefore needs to be guided by concerns for both economic competitiveness and historical justice, and the role of IP in this process should be framed in these terms. This chapter concludes by suggesting three policy opportunities within the IP space that may be considered to ensure that cannabis reform and IP law are congruent in a path towards inclusive economic development.
Keywords: Drug reform; Postcolonialism; Political economy; Cannabis; Intellectual property rights (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
ISBN: 9781035329380
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