A poor case for a “digital platform agency”

Lawrence J. Spiwak

Chapter 3 in Research Handbook on Digital Regulatory Agencies, 2026, pp 28-41 from Edward Elgar Publishing

Abstract: Frustrated with the high evidentiary requirements and slow pace of antitrust cases, some critics of “Big Tech” are now looking for alternative forums for direct regulatory oversight—forums with a more anticipatory, immediate, and interventionalist perspective. Without an obvious choice among existing enforcement/regulatory agencies—all of which are often heavily criticized as ineffective, if not captured—there are some who seek the creation of a new dedicated regulatory entity with expansive powers over the Internet Ecosystem (and beyond). All of these proposals are long on hyperbole but short on details. While imperfect, antitrust is grounded in precedent and conducted in a dispassionate manner, thus avoiding the pitfalls of regulatory capture and rent-seeking. Accordingly, if we are concerned that antitrust enforcement is lacking, then perhaps appointing less politically motivated and competent people to head the antitrust agencies, coupled with more alert Congressional oversight, is the better policy choice at this time.

Keywords: Antitrust; Regulation; Digital Regulator; Content Moderation; Due Process; Big Tech (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2026
ISBN: 9781035330881
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