Economic challenges for competition policy and regulation in digital markets

Mark A. Jamison

Chapter 5 in Research Handbook on Digital Regulatory Agencies, 2026, pp 65-80 from Edward Elgar Publishing

Abstract: This chapter explores the complexities of regulating digital markets, focusing on differing views of antitrust, market power, and innovation. Economics views the exercise of market power as harming consumers by restricting output, while the neo-Brandeisians view large firms as threats to economic and political systems. Digital markets’ distinctive features, including network effects, tipping, modularity, and dynamism, present challenges for both perspectives, suggesting a need for regulatory strategies that adapt to rapid changes and evolving markets. This chapter also discusses innovation and the debate over specialized digital regulators. Innovation is unrelated to firm size and market power, making it of little importance for antitrust. Decisions regarding choice of regulator should consider historical precedents. Also, motivations for a new regulator, such as a desire for specialized expertise, should be critically examined to ensure that a new agency is truly a cure for the perceived problems.

Keywords: Digital Markets; Antitrust; Dynamic Markets; Digital Regulator; Network Effects (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2026
ISBN: 9781035330881
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