How to save central banks’ independence from the unconservative governor: the alarming case of the National Bank of Poland

Andrzej Wojtyna

Chapter 9 in Are Central Banks Still Conservative?, 2025, pp 208-229 from Edward Elgar Publishing

Abstract: The main objective of the chapter is to try to explain the new phenomenon that can tentatively be called a syndrome of the perverse independence of the National Bank of Poland (NBP). The syndrome, in essence, is that when sound mechanisms of both appointment and democratic accountability are absent or significantly weakened and hence inefficient, the central bank takes advantage of its formal independence and subordinates its decisions to the expectations of the authoritarian government. It intentionally accepts or even self-imposes fiscal and political dominance that contradicts its mission and legal obligations but serves well the ruling party. This also means that the central bank independence principle is used “innovatively” as a smokescreen that makes it possible for the governor to consolidate his power in the central bank and allows him to support his political grouping even after a lost election. So the “perverse case of the NBP” is exceptional but goes largely unnoticed because, unlike in some other similar authoritarian/populist cases, there is no need for the government to exert pressure on the central bank to change its policy. Neither is this a case of the central bank's self-censorship aimed at not provoking government's criticism and pressure.

Keywords: Central bank independence; Democratic accountability; Authoritarianism; Populism; National Bank of Poland (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
ISBN: 9781035337569
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