Pricing of sporting events

Thomas Miceli ()

Chapter 3 in Topics in Sports Economics, 2025, pp 27-44 from Edward Elgar Publishing

Abstract: This chapter begins by examining the practice of price discrimination by monopolistic firms (teams). This involves setting different prices for different consumers based on differences in their demand characteristics. Under first-degree (perfect) price discrimination, the price for all consumers equals their full valuation of the product. This outcome is not practical, however, because consumer valuations are not observable. Under third-degree price discrimination, the monopolist segments the market into distinguishable groups and charges a higher price in those segments with more inelastic demand. Under second-degree price discrimination, the monopolist offers a menu of pricing options from which consumers self-select, thereby sorting themselves into different segments. Examples of the latter practice are two-part pricing and quantity discounts. The chapter concludes by discussing ticket scalping, both why it happens and whether it should be permitted.

Keywords: Price discrimination; Two-part pricing; Quantity discounts; Ticket scalping (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
ISBN: 9781035339389
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