Leagues as economic organizations

Thomas Miceli ()

Chapter 4 in Topics in Sports Economics, 2025, pp 46-65 from Edward Elgar Publishing

Abstract: This chapter examines economic competition among teams within an organized league. The argument is that a league coordinates the decisions of member teams in the same way that a market coordinates the decisions of firms. The emphasis here is strictly on business decisions—the determination of price and output. The analysis employs standard economic models of oligopoly, particularly the Cournot and Bertrand models. An extension of the latter introduces a spatial dimension, which reflects actual spatial competition but can also serve as a proxy for team loyalty among fans. The chapter concludes by examining the cartel nature of leagues, specifically how they coordinate team decision-making. Unlike ordinary markets, some coordination is necessary because teams cannot supply games unilaterally.

Keywords: Imperfect competition; Oligopoly; Cournot model; Bertrand model; Spatial competition; Cartels (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
ISBN: 9781035339389
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