The nature of competition on the field

Thomas Miceli ()

Chapter 5 in Topics in Sports Economics, 2025, pp 66-82 from Edward Elgar Publishing

Abstract: This chapter examines the nature of team competition on the field of play. It uses a conflict model to describe the strategic interdependency of teams competing for a league championship or for individual contestants in a tournament setting. The model considers how the value of the “prize,” the number of contestants, and the structure of the reward scheme affect the actions of contestants. The conclusions of the analysis are used to examine the optimal structure of non-profit and professional tournaments and team sports leagues.

Keywords: Contest model; Strategic behavior; Reward schemes; Optimal contests (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
ISBN: 9781035339389
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