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Proportionality of sanctions

Nathanael Tilahun

Chapter 63 in Elgar Encyclopedia of International Sanctions, 2025, pp 220-222 from Edward Elgar Publishing

Abstract: The use of sanctions – formally known as countermeasures – is primarily governed in general international law under the customary rules on state responsibility. International law allows states to resort to measures, including unlawful measures, in responding to prior wrongful conduct by another state. The extent of such measures is, however, bound by the principle of proportionality. The basic definition of proportionality applicable to countermeasures is one of injury equivalence – i.e. the countermeasure should be proportional to the injury the state suffered as a result of the original wrongful conduct by the other state. Two additional contextual factors must be taken into consideration when implementing this basic definition: (i) the gravity of the original wrongdoing and (ii) the rights that may be affected by the countermeasure. Applying this conceptual framework in practice is not a straightforward exercise, as recognised by the International Court of Justice. Wrongful conduct that is difficult to quantify, such as human rights violations, eludes the application of the injury equivalence test. Furthermore, the existing customary rules do not sufficiently cater for the assessment of proportionality in cases of concurrent countermeasures (several states adopting countermeasures in response to the same conduct) and the protracted application of countermeasures that lead to severe aggregated harm.

Keywords: Countermeasures; Proportionality; Injury; Humanitarian impact (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
ISBN: 9781035339525
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