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Security exceptions

Iryna Bogdanova

Chapter 68 in Elgar Encyclopedia of International Sanctions, 2025, pp 234-236 from Edward Elgar Publishing

Abstract: Security exceptions are provisions in international trade and investment agreements that allow states to deviate from their obligations for national security reasons. Traditionally, these exceptions were formulated to address conventional threats, e.g., trade in fissionable materials, arms, and ammunition, or trade-restrictive measures taken in times of war or other major disruptions in international relations. With the passing of time, the nature of national security risks has evolved to include threats such as climate change and cybercrime. In dispute settlement proceedings, national security exceptions are crucial in justifying economic sanctions if sanctions breach international trade or investment agreements. The International Court of Justice (ICJ) and the World Trade Organization (WTO) panels interpreted national security exceptions. Both tribunals agreed that the exact wording of such exceptions defines the ambit of states’ discretion in taking measures necessary to protect their security interests. Recent cases, such as Certain Iranian Assets and Russia – Traffic in Transit, illustrate the tribunals’ approaches towards the possibility of justifying economic sanctions incompatible with the obligations under international trade and investment agreements on national security grounds.

Keywords: National security; Trade; Investment; Dispute settlement (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
ISBN: 9781035339525
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