United Nations expert panels

Caty Clément

Chapter 72 in Elgar Encyclopedia of International Sanctions, 2025, pp 248-252 from Edward Elgar Publishing

Abstract: Expert panels serve as the ‘eyes and ears’ of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) on the sanctioned country, institution or issue, but they have recently come under considerable stress. The panels of experts were established in response to the recognition that, in the absence of an independent monitoring mechanism, sanctions regimes were often ineffective. Expert panels and monitoring bodies have served since the late 1990s as indispensable sanctions enforcement tools, which explains why for several decades they supported nearly all sanctions committees. Contrary to many regional or unilateral sanctions often used as low-key warfare strategies, UN sanctions aim to pursue world peace and improve human welfare. The development of expert groups had three phases: first, the recognition that sanctions without monitoring were ineffective; second, the understanding that panels needed genuine investigative powers; and third, the importance of professional standards, which were notably promoted by the Group of Friends. The most effective sanction regimes are those where there is a strong engagement by both the experts and the sanctions’ committee. The experts’ independence is crucial; however, it faces important caveats of multiple natures: political, administrative, financial and security-related. The most successful panels result from several factors: the capacity to coordinate, the political dynamics within the sanctions committee and the UNSC, and the quality of the investigative process. Over the past decade, expert panels have suffered from the degrading global consensus: becoming scarce, less endowed and facing more objections, a reflection of geopolitical power struggles.

Keywords: Independent investigation; United Nations sanctions; Expert panels; Conflict minerals; Sanctions monitoring (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
ISBN: 9781035339525
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