What are the intentions in bounded rationality theory?

Alexander Styhre ()

Chapter 5 in A Pragmatist Theory of Economic Reason, 2025, pp 104-126 from Edward Elgar Publishing

Abstract: Management studies scholars generally accept Herbert Simon's bounded rationality proposition, which stipulates that human beings, in the ordinary state of affairs, intend to act rationally but only achieve a certain “bounded level” of rationality despite such ambitions. Simon's proposition is logically consistent and accommodates a variety of empirical material being reported, but the question of what it means to “intend” to act rationally remains undertheorized and thus unclear. The chapter examines what it means to act for reasons according to the analytical philosophy literature that addresses the question of intentions, which is a premise for agency, under the influence of both freedom and restraining social norms. Simon's concept of bounded rationality would be more robust if the concept of intentionality were treated in the same manner as the concept of rationality – that is, to be regarded with a healthy scepticism in both epistemic and pragmatic terms.

Keywords: Bounded rationality; Intention; Intentionality; Agency (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
ISBN: 9781035343911
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