Financial market regulation and the common good: the failure of “too-big-to-fail”

Peter Marshall and Wesley Marshall

Chapter 5 in Central Banking, Monetary Policy and the Common Good, 2026, pp 74-98 from Edward Elgar Publishing

Abstract: This chapter examines the financial regulation in the United States in the wake of the global financial crisis that burst in 2008, and argues that risks have been shifted within the financial system but not reduced. To the contrary, the plumbing of the Treasury market has been damaged while financial markets have grown in size and concentration. Even though regulations were effectuated under considerations of the common good, some privileges have been maintained for certain private interests. We examine both the institutional evolution of the Treasuries market and prime brokerage, and argue that in both cases a small number of actors and operations are allowed to exist in the regulatory and market shadows, to the great detriment of the financial stability of the markets, and to the public at large.

Keywords: Financial regulation; Primary dealers; Prime brokers; Repurchase market (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2026
ISBN: 9781035348299
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://www.elgaronline.com/doi/10.4337/9781035348305.00012 (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:elg:eechap:24020_5

Ordering information: This item can be ordered from
http://www.e-elgar.com

Access Statistics for this chapter

More chapters in Chapters from Edward Elgar Publishing
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Jack Sweeney ().