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Private efficiency in public–private partnerships: theories and evidence

Wei Xiong

Chapter 2 in The Origins and Evolution of Public–Private Partnerships, 2026, pp 32-50 from Edward Elgar Publishing

Abstract: Efficiency is the most frequent justification for adopting public–private partnerships (PPPs), yet its realization remains contested. This chapter examines the theoretical mechanisms and empirical evidence regarding private efficiency in PPPs. It integrates three theoretical lenses: Property Rights Theory, regarding ownership incentives and the bundling of construction and operations; Principal–Agent Theory, regarding information asymmetries, adverse selection, and moral hazard; and Transaction Cost Economics, regarding asset specificity, difficulty of measurement, and long-term uncertainty. The chapter synthesizes empirical evidence on cost performance and service quality, revealing a mixed record where efficiency gains are often offset by high transaction costs and governance risks like renegotiation. It concludes that efficiency is not an inherent trait of private participation but a conditional outcome dependent on institutional quality, robust competition, and effective contract enforcement.

Keywords: Private Efficiency; Property Rights Theory; Principal; Agent Theory; Transaction Cost Economics; Contract Bundling; Information Asymmetry (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2026
ISBN: 9781035356553
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