Multiple linkages: Parliaments, parties and interest groups in intergovernmental negotiations

Arthur Benz

Chapter 8 in Understanding Federal Democracy, 2026, pp 141-162 from Edward Elgar Publishing

Abstract: In important policy fields, federal and regional governments must negotiate intergovernmental agreements to avoid negative external effects, injustice or power conflicts. Accountable to parliaments and influenced by party competition, negotiating executives engage in strategic bargaining. Thus, democracy limits the chances for effective agreements, whereas information and power asymmetries between executives, powerful interest groups and elected representatives of citizens limit democratic legitimacy. To avoid these imbalances, not only negotiating executives, but also actors who influence or control them must engage in communication and deliberation across jurisdictions. This chapter focuses on processes that link the intra- and intergovernmental political arenas. They have developed in all mature federal democracies but differ considerably, depending on institutional conditions, party systems and the influence of civil society. In general, redundant linkages can complement each other and enhance the effectiveness and legitimacy of coordinated governance in a federal democracy.

Keywords: Bicameralism; Interest Groups; Intergovernmental Diplomacy; Inter-parliamentary Relations; Party System; Redundancy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2026
ISBN: 9781035361489
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