Social intuitionist theory

Neil J. MacKinnon

Chapter 6 in The Social Psychology of Morality, 2025, pp 73-82 from Edward Elgar Publishing

Abstract: This chapter introduces the social intuitionist theory of morality of Haidt and associates. In contrast to the rationalist theories of morality of Piaget and Kohlberg, social intuitionist theory proposes that moral judgments are primarily a product of emotional response and intuition rather than cognitive deliberation and reason, which kicks in only after the fact to justify moral judgments that have already been made intuitively. The chapter also discusses moral foundations theory (MFT), an offspring of social intuitionist theory (SIT) that attempts to explain moral reasoning in terms of five purportedly distinct and innate foundations or modules. As discussed in the conclusion to this chapter, SIT has been criticized for underemphasizing the role of reason in moral judgment, for viewing intuition and reason as qualitatively distinct processes located in distinct areas of the brain, and for treating the five moral foundations of MFT as distinct modules of the brain.

Keywords: Haidt; Intuition; Reason; Moral foundations (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
ISBN: 9781035364732
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