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Permissibility of parallel framework agreements

Magdalena Socha

Chapter 4 in Parallel Framework Agreements in EU Public Procurement Law, 2026, pp 105-153 from Edward Elgar Publishing

Abstract: Legality of simultaneous procurement from more than one framework agreement established for overlapping subject matter represents a gap in EU public procurement law. This chapter aims to bridge this gap, analyses compliance of parallel framework agreements with the EU public procurement law and principles. Firstly, it investigates under what circumstances, according to Directive 2014/24/EU and the case law of the CJEU, contracting authorities can freely procure outside of a framework agreement and when such procurement is restricted. This chapter further examines the (non)exclusive nature of framework agreements and their relationship with public contracts – topics that are underexplored in existing literature and interpreted differently at the national level. The analysis shows that the absence of pecuniary obligations at the framework agreement stage prevents the agreement from acquiring a synallagmatic (i.e., reciprocal and binding) nature. Consequently, framework agreements are not inherently binding. However, procurement from parallel framework agreements is permissible, rather than ‘legal’. This is contingent upon ensuring that the selection among available agreements adheres to the principles of transparency and equal treatment. By doing so, this chapter answers the second research question: Are parallel framework agreements compatible with EU public procurement law and principles?

Keywords: Framework Agreements; Public Contracts; Binding Contracts; Legality Assessment; Pecuniary Interest; Reciprocal Obligations; Exclusivity (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2026
ISBN: 9781035389261
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