Limited discretion on the choice between parallel framework agreements
Magdalena Socha
Chapter 5 in Parallel Framework Agreements in EU Public Procurement Law, 2026, pp 154-192 from Edward Elgar Publishing
Abstract:
A simple conclusion that, due to the non-exclusive nature of framework agreements, contracting authorities are free to procure outside these agreements could suggest that they have unrestricted freedom of choice between parallel framework agreements. However, this chapter argues that in order to benefit from simultaneous access to parallel framework agreements, contracting authorities must adopt an objective method for selecting between them that complies with the principles of transparency and equal treatment and does not result in the prevention, distortion, or restriction of competition. These requirements are derived not only from the principles governing Directive 2014/24/EU but also from the general principles of EU law, including effective judicial protection and the duty to state reasons. By doing so, this chapter answers the third research question: How can contracting authorities choose between parallel framework agreements in compliance with EU public procurement law principles?
Keywords: Discretion; Parallel Procedures; Freedom of Choice; Flexibility; Duty to State Reasons; Effective Judicial Protection; Objective Criteria (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2026
ISBN: 9781035389261
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