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Legitimate expectations in parallel framework agreements

Magdalena Socha

Chapter 6 in Parallel Framework Agreements in EU Public Procurement Law, 2026, pp 194-216 from Edward Elgar Publishing

Abstract: Since procurement from parallel framework agreements is, as a rule, permissible, the question arises as to how economic operators included in an already-established framework agreement can protect their interests when contracting authorities choose to procure under a newly-concluded, parallel framework agreement. This chapter explores the possibility for economic operators to invoke the principle of protection of legitimate expectations in the context of procurement from framework agreements, particularly with regard to parallel framework agreements. Through a thorough analysis of CJEU case law and relevant literature, the chapter examines whether the first stage of framework agreements can be considered a justifiable reliance that invokes the protection of legitimate expectations for suppliers admitted to a framework agreement. The chapter concludes that, although the design of a framework agreement may resemble a promise from the public institution, its contractual nature does not provide grounds for the protection of legitimate expectations. By doing so, this chapter answers the first part of the fourth research question: Can access to parallel framework agreements be limited when confronted with the principle of protection of legitimate expectations?

Keywords: Framework Agreements; Parallel Framework Agreements; Legitimate Expectations; Duty to State Reasons; Justifiable Reliance (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2026
ISBN: 9781035389261
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