Competition in parallel framework agreements

Magdalena Socha

Chapter 7 in Parallel Framework Agreements in EU Public Procurement Law, 2026, pp 217-251 from Edward Elgar Publishing

Abstract: The existence of multiple framework agreements covering the same or overlapping subject matter almost intuitively raises questions about their impact on competition in the internal market. This chapter therefore examines the relationship between parallel framework agreements and competition and clarifies what is meant by ‘competition’ in the context of parallel framework agreements. This chapter further examines how prohibiting using framework agreements improperly or in a way that prevents, restricts, or distorts competition influences procurement from parallel framework agreements. Building on the case from the CJEU, especially Autorità and Simonsen & Weel, where the CJEU explicitly recognised the importance of safeguarding competition within the context of framework agreements, this chapter argues that regardless of the recognition of the competition principle as a general principle of EU public procurement law, such a principle exists in the specific context of framework agreements. The chapter concludes that recognising this principle would enhance enforcement against potential anti-competitive behaviours arising from parallel framework agreements, as it addresses their actual market effects rather than the intentions behind procurement design. By doing so, this chapter answers the second part of the fourth research question: Can access to parallel framework agreements be limited when confronted with the principle of competition in framework agreements?

Keywords: Framework Agreements; Parallel Framework Agreements; Principle; Competition; Intention; Parallel Procedures (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2026
ISBN: 9781035389261
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