The ECB's independence and the applicability of secondary law

Annelieke A.M. Mooij

Chapter 3 in Designing the Digital Euro, 2026, pp 16-25 from Edward Elgar Publishing

Abstract: This chapter examines the European Central Bank's (ECB’s) independence and its interplay with secondary legislation in the context of designing the digital euro. It explores the legal and institutional implications of introducing such a novel currency system, focusing on collaboration with the legislator and the ECB's constitutional status. By analyzing case law, including the OLAF decision, and the ECB's mandates, the chapter highlights the challenges of designing a digital euro that upholds privacy, ensures security, and aligns with the ECB's primary objective of maintaining price stability.

Keywords: Digital Euro; CBDC; European Central Bank Independence; Secondary Mandate; Monetary Union; Primary Mandate; Fundamental Rights (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2026
ISBN: 9781035390632
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://www.elgaronline.com/doi/10.4337/9781035390649.00008 (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:elg:eechap:25419_3

Ordering information: This item can be ordered from
http://www.e-elgar.com

Access Statistics for this chapter

More chapters in Chapters from Edward Elgar Publishing
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Darrel McCalla ().