Conclusion: The Fall and Rise of Modern Game Theory

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Chapter 6 in Modeling Rational Agents, 2003, pp 341-410 from Edward Elgar Publishing

Abstract: The book explores the evolution, through the first half of the 20th century, of the key neoclassical concept of rationality. The analysis begins with the development of modern decision theory, covers the interwar debates over the role of perfect foresight and analyses the first game-theoretic solution concepts of von Neumann and Nash.

Keywords: Economics and Finance (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2003
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