Competition in banking: switching costs and the limits of antitrust enforcement

Donatella Porrini and Giovanni Ramello ()

Chapter 13 in Law and the State, 2005 from Edward Elgar Publishing

Abstract: Law and the State provides a political economy analysis of the legal functioning of a democratic state, illustrating how it builds on informational and legal constraints. It explains, in an organised and thematic fashion, how competitive information enhances democracy while strategic information endangers it, and discusses how legal constraints stress the dilemma of independence versus discretion for judges as well as the elusive role of administrators and experts.

Date: 2005
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Related works:
Working Paper: Competition in Banking: Switching Costs and the Limits of Antitrust Enforcement (2004)
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