Democratic Institutions and Corruption: Incentives and Constraints in Politics

Jana Kunicová

Chapter 5 in International Handbook on the Economics of Corruption, 2006 from Edward Elgar Publishing

Abstract: Economic research on corruption aims both to isolate the economic effects of quid pro quo deals between agents and third parties, and to suggest how legal and institutional reforms might curb harms and enhance benefits. In this comprehensive Handbook, top scholars in the field provide specially commissioned essays, both theoretical and empirical, exploring both types of research.

Keywords: Economics and Finance; Law - Academic (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2006
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