Criminalization and Leniency: Will the Combination Favourably Affect Cartel Stability?
Patrick Massey ()
Chapter 9 in Criminalization of Competition Law Enforcement, 2006 from Edward Elgar Publishing
This timely book brings together contributions from prominent scholars and practitioners to the ongoing debate on the criminalization of competition law enforcement. Recognizing that existing remedies and sanctions may be insufficient to deter breaches of competition law, several EU Member States have followed the US example and introduced pecuniary penalties for executives, professional disqualification orders, and even jail sentences. Addressing issues such as unsolved legal puzzles, standard of proof, leniency programs and internal cartel stability, this book is a marker for future policy debate.
Keywords: Law - Academic (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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