Banking Regulation and Knowledge Problems

Thomas Hogan () and G. P. Manish

A chapter in Studies in Austrian Macroeconomics, 2016, vol. 20, pp 213-234 from Emerald Group Publishing Limited

Abstract: The Federal Reserve regulates U.S. commercial banks using a system of risk-based capital (RBC) regulations based on the Basel Accords. Unfortunately, the Fed’s mis-rating of several assets such as mortgage-backed securities encouraged the build-up of these assets in the banking system and was a major contributing factor to the 2008 financial crisis. The Basel system of RBC regulation is a prime example of a Hayekian knowledge problem. The contextual, tacit, and subjective knowledge required to properly assess asset risk cannot be aggregated and utilized by regulators. An effective system of banking regulation must acknowledge man’s limited knowledge and place greater value on individual decisions than on top-down planning.

Keywords: Federal Reserve; Basel Accord; risk-based capital; knowledge problem; G18; E58; P50 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

Downloads: (external link)
https://www.emerald.com/insight/content/doi/10.110 ... d&utm_campaign=repec (text/html)
https://www.emerald.com/insight/content/doi/10.110 ... 9-213420160000020010
https://www.emerald.com/insight/content/doi/10.110 ... d&utm_campaign=repec (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eme:aaeczz:s1529-213420160000020010

DOI: 10.1108/S1529-213420160000020010

Access Statistics for this chapter

More chapters in Advances in Austrian Economics from Emerald Group Publishing Limited
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Emerald Support ().