Constitutionalism, Federalism, and Limited Government: Hayekian Arguments in Political Scientists’ Perspective

Viktor J. Vanberg

A chapter in Revisiting Hayek’s Political Economy, 2016, vol. 21, pp 123-143 from Emerald Group Publishing Limited

Abstract: The notion of constitutionalism and federalism as principal devices for limiting the power of government is central to F. A. Hayek’s political philosophy. A number of political scientists have recently criticized Hayek’s (as well as J. M. Buchanan’s and B. R. Weingast’s) reasoning on this subject for its presumed “neoliberal bias.” This paper reviews this critique and takes it as a challenge to clarify certain ambiguities in Hayek’s – and, more generally, in liberal – accounts of constitutionalism and federalism.

Keywords: Constitutionalism; federalism; limited government (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eme:aaeczz:s1529-213420160000021004

DOI: 10.1108/S1529-213420160000021004

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