Economics at your fingertips  

Robust Against Whom?

Nick Cowen

A chapter in Austrian Economics: The Next Generation, 2018, vol. 23, pp 91-111 from Emerald Publishing Ltd

Abstract: Abstract Robust political economy (RPE) is a research program that combines insights from Austrian economics and public choice to evaluate the performance of institutions in cases of limited knowledge and limited altruism, or “worst-case scenarios.” Many critics of RPE argue that it is too narrowly focused on the bad motivations and inadequacies of social actors while smuggling in classical liberal normative commitments as part of a purported solution to these problems. This chapter takes a different tack by highlighting the ways that RPE as currently understood may not be robust against particularly bad conduct. It suggests that depending on the parameters of what constitutes a worst-case scenario, classical liberal institutions, especially a minimal state, may turn out to be less robust than some conservative or social democratic alternatives.

Keywords: Robust political economy; public choice; tuism; altruism; perverse preferences; minimal state (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: Track citations by RSS feed

Downloads: (external link) ... RePEc&WT.mc_id=RePEc (text/html)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link:

Ordering information: This item can be ordered from
Emerald Group Publishing, Howard House, Wagon Lane, Bingley, BD16 1WA, UK
http://www.emeraldgr ... ies.htm?id=1529-2134

Access Statistics for this chapter

More chapters in Advances in Austrian Economics from Emerald Publishing Ltd
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Charlotte Maiorana ().

Page updated 2019-03-02
Handle: RePEc:eme:aaeczz:s1529-213420180000023008