BANK MONITORING, FIRM PERFORMANCE, AND TOP MANAGEMENT TURNOVER IN JAPAN

Christopher W Anderson, Terry L Campbell, Narayanan Jayaraman and Gershon N Mandelker

A chapter in Advances in Financial Economics, 2003, pp 1-27 from Emerald Group Publishing Limited

Abstract: An inverse relation between performance and managerial turnover at Japanese firms suggests that bank monitoring substitutes for other governance mechanisms (Kaplan, 1994; Kang & Shivdasani, 1995). Morck and Nakamura (1999), however, report that Japanese banks protect their self-interests as creditors rather than the interests of shareholders when appointing corporate directors. We re-examine data on top management changes at Japanese firms and find results consistent with this latter notion. Specifically, management turnover is conditionally related to a firm’s ability to meet its short-term obligations rather than profitability or stock returns. Bank monitoring is therefore not a substitute for mechanisms that directly serve shareholders’ interests.

Date: 2003
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://www.emerald.com/insight/content/doi/10.101 ... d&utm_campaign=repec (text/html)
https://www.emerald.com/insight/content/doi/10.101 ... d&utm_campaign=repec (application/pdf)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eme:afeczz:s1569-3732(03)08001-0

DOI: 10.1016/S1569-3732(03)08001-0

Access Statistics for this chapter

More chapters in Advances in Financial Economics from Emerald Group Publishing Limited
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Emerald Support ().