OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE AND SHAREHOLDER VOTING ON BOARD STRUCTURE CHANGES

Teresa A John and Gopala K Vasudevan

A chapter in Advances in Financial Economics, 2003, pp 113-125 from Emerald Group Publishing Limited

Abstract: We examine voting outcomes on shareholder governance proposals that seek annual elections for all the directors on the corporate board. We relate these voting outcomes to different ownership structure characteristics and a series of variables that are publicly available. The pattern of support indicates that proposals are generally successful when they are supported by large activist groups and when institutions hold a significant fraction of shares outstanding. Our evidence casts some doubt on the efficacy of the Rule 14A-8 mechanism, which limits the amount of information that can be provided to shareholders as part of the proposal.

Date: 2003
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eme:afeczz:s1569-3732(03)08005-8

DOI: 10.1016/S1569-3732(03)08005-8

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