Chapter 4 The Evolution and Utilization of the GATT/WTO Dispute Settlement Mechanism

Pao-Li Chang

A chapter in Trade Disputes and the Dispute Settlement Understanding of the WTO: An Interdisciplinary Assessment, 2009, pp 91-118 from Emerald Group Publishing Limited

Abstract: This chapter provides a theoretical framework of dispute settlement to explain the surge in blocking incidence of GATT panel reports during the 1980s and the variations in withdrawn incidence versus total disputes across different decades of the GATT regime. The study first suggests the role of the degree of legal controversy over a panel ruling in determining countries' incentives to block (appeal) a panel report under the GATT (WTO) regime. The study then analyzes the effects of political power on countries' incentives to use, and their interactions in using, the dispute settlement mechanism, given two-sided asymmetric information regarding panel judgement.

Keywords: Dispute settlement; legal controversy; block; appeal; two-sided asymmetric information; political cost (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eme:fegzzz:s1574-8715(2009)0000006007

DOI: 10.1108/S1574-8715(2009)0000006007

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