COMPARING STUDENTS TO WORKERS: THE EFFECTS OF SOCIAL FRAMING ON BEHAVIOR IN DISTRIBUTION GAMES

Jeffrey P. Carpenter, Stephen Burks and Eric Verhoogen

A chapter in Field Experiments in Economics, 2005, pp 261-289 from Emerald Group Publishing Limited

Abstract: To investigate the external validity of Ultimatum and Dictator game behavior we conduct experiments in field settings with naturally occurring variation in “social framing.” Our participants are students at Middlebury College, non-traditional students at Kansas City Kansas Community College (KCKCC), and employees at a Kansas City distribution center. Ultimatum game offers are ordered: KCKCC > employee > Middlebury. In the Dictator game employees are more generous than students in either location. Workers behaved distinctly from both student groups in that their allocations do not decrease between games, an effect we attribute to the social framing of the workplace.

Date: 2005
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Working Paper: Comparing Students to Workers: The Effects of Social Framing on Behavior in Distribution Games (2004)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eme:rexezz:s0193-2306(04)10007-0

DOI: 10.1016/S0193-2306(04)10007-0

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