Sealed Bid Variations on the Silent Auction

R. Isaac and Kurt Schnier

A chapter in Experiments Investigating Fundraising and Charitable Contributors, 2006, pp 31-46 from Emerald Group Publishing Limited

Abstract: Motivated by both prior experimental work and by field observations, we consider the performance of two different sealed bid versions of the silent auction. These are important institutional alternatives to the more familiar ascending price silent auction. In a new series of laboratory experiments, we investigate the effects of the different institutions both on aggregate efficiency and upon aggregate revenue generation.

Date: 2006
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eme:rexezz:s0193-2306(06)11002-9

DOI: 10.1016/S0193-2306(06)11002-9

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