The voluntary provision of a public good with binding multi-round commitments

Matthew A. Halloran, James Walker and Arlington Williams

A chapter in Experiments Investigating Fundraising and Charitable Contributors, 2006, pp 225-246 from Emerald Group Publishing Limited

Abstract: This paper examines binding multi-round commitments (MRCs) to the group account in a repeated voluntary contributions mechanism (VCM) game. Before each five-round interval, subjects in a four-person group are given the option to commit a portion of their endowments to the group account for each of the next five rounds. Decision rounds proceed, with each subject's commitment acting as the binding minimum of his group-account allocation for each round. The opportunity to make MRCs does not increase mean allocations to the group account relative to a control treatment. However, commitments do have implications for reciprocal behavior within groups, leading to higher outcome variances across groups in the MRCs treatment.

Date: 2006
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eme:rexezz:s0193-2306(06)11009-1

DOI: 10.1016/S0193-2306(06)11009-1

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